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A onda de ataques terroristas na França nos últimos anos 
provocou vários debates, mas muitas questões 
continuam sem resposta. Uma grande controvérsia diz 
respeito ao papel que a religião desempenha no 
envolvimento de pessoas no jihadismo. O objetivo de O 
terrorismo jihadista tem fundamentos religiosos? 
Ataques jihadistas e controvérsias acadêmicas na 
França (2012-2017) é situar a forma como o debate 
sobre essa questão tem sido estruturado. A primeira 
parte examina o jihadismo contemporâneo como um 
objeto de conhecimento no contexto intelectual 
francês. A segunda parte analisa o debate que surgiu 
entre os intelectuais franceses sobre o papel da religião 
no envolvimento de jovens adultos e adolescentes 
franceses com o jihadismo. A terceira parte apresenta 
algumas reflexões críticas sobre essas questões. 
The wave of terrorist attacks in France in 
recent years has provoked a great deal of 
debate but many questions remain 
unanswered. One major controversy concerns 
the role religion plays in people taking jihadist 
action. The aim of this article is to resituate 
how debate on this question has been 
structured. The first part of the article 
examines contemporary jihadism as a 
knowledge object in the French intellectual 
context. The second part analyses the debate 
that has emerged among French intellectuals 
regarding the role of religion in the drift 
towards jihadism of young French adults and 
juveniles. The third part presents some critical 
reflections on these issues. 
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In recent years France has undergone a wave of terrorist attacks more or less closely linked 
to the situation in Iraq and in Syria. These have naturally provoked a great deal of study and 
thought but currently there are few proper empirical research studies and many questions remain 
unanswered. One of the most burning controversies concerns the role religion plays in people 
taking jihadist action and the aim of this article is to resituate how debate on this question has 
been structured for readers who are relatively far from these preoccupations. 
* 
 
o briefly situate the events which are the subject of the debate I intend to discuss, I shall
reiterate that between 2012 and the present France is the country which has been
subjected to the most jihadist attacks2 in Western Europe. It is generally agreed that theT 
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current sequence of attacks began with the murders committed by Mohamed Mehra between the 
11th and the 19th of March 2012 when Mehra killed 3 soldiers then attacked a Jewish school where 
he killed 3 children and the father of two of the children in cold blood while filming himself with 
a GoPro camera before being killed himself by the police in the siege of his home. Since 1996, 
there had been no Islamist terrorist attacks in France. 
Some of the recent attacks are among the most murderous in the last 50 years. In this macabre 
classification, obviously the attacks on November 13th 2015 in Paris (130 dead, 414 injured) and 
Nice on July 14th 2016 (85 dead and 201 injured) stand out. However it should be pointed out that 
France is not the main target for this terrorism. It is estimated that in the two years following Isis’s 
declaration of the “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq in June 2014 over 200 terrorist acts were committed 
by the organization or its “branches” in 28 countries with over 3000 people killed (AUDUREAU, 
ZERROUKY and VAUDANO, 28/07/2016)3. 
The characteristics of the perpetrators of successful attacks are better known than those of 
people who left France to join terrorist groups or who were prevented from doing so by the 
authorities. According to the Paris state prosecutor, it is estimated that at the end of 2017 around 
700 adults (400 men and 300 women4) from France were still in Syria/Iraq along with around 430 
minors (thirty of whom were listed as combatants). Some 265 people are said to have died there 
(including 8 women) and a similar number of people have come back to France. The average age 
is estimated at 25 with 25% of those who left being religious converts. Around a thousand 
departures were prevented while 15,000 people are said to have been listed by the security services 
as supposed to support the Islamist movement.5 
Among the 22 terrorists who attacked France between 2012 and 2016, two thirds are known 
to have been born in France or held French nationality, 60% of them to have served prison terms, 
30% to have left for Syria/Iraq and that 90% of them had been were previously known to the 
French and/or Belgian police (LAURENT, 29/07/2016). 
Even though the question of the exact link between the jihadists and the organizations they 
claim to belong to (Al Qaeda and its branches or Daesh) remains a subject for discussion in certain 
cases, the perpetrators of the attacks all claim in one way or another to follow Islam and even a 
version of it which they present as being the purest. And yet, university studies show that evidence 
of the link between the attacks, the perpetrators and the Muslim religion is far from accepted or 
is at least the subject of virulent controversies. 
Before presenting these, I would like to discuss what seems to me to differentiate between 
the current wave of terrorist attacks and previous attacks and how this specific feature makes it 
more complicated to attain knowledge of the phenomena. This will be the subject of the first part 
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of my article. I will then examine French intellectual debates in the light of this difficulty in the 
second part before concluding with a critical examination of these controversies. 
 
 
Contemporary jihadism as a knowledge object 
 
The specific nature of contemporary jihadism 
 
In a review published around twenty years ago, the political scientist Isabelle Sommier made 
a distinction between four main types of terrorism which were community-based (irredentist or 
nationalist movements); revolutionary (far right or far left movements); state terrorism either 
domestic (against the state's own population or part of it), or external (manipulation of terrorist 
groups for external political goals); and finally, religious (SOMMIER, 2000, p. 44s.). 
We know that terrorism – as a method of action aimed at “creating a climate of insecurity to 
blackmail a government, to satisfy hate of a community, country or system”6 – is not a new political 
phenomenon and can be linked to very diverse causes. Historians generally date the start of terrorist 
attacks back to those committed by Russian nihilists and anarchists at the end of the 19th and the start 
of 20th century7. In recent decades, France has been subjected to all these different forms of terrorism 
with varying degrees of deadliness including religiously inspired terrorism. This form appeared in the 
middle of the 1990s and foreshadowed in some ways the current wave of terrorism (particularly with 
the involvement of young delinquents of Maghrebi origins from the poorer suburbs). However it 
could also be seen as the extension of an exterior conflict namely the Algerian civil war and to be “in 
the name of Algerian political interests and important issues” (see KEPEL, 2000, pp. 304-307)8. 
The specific nature of the current sequence of jihadist terrorism lies above all in the fact that 
it claims to be an eschatological movement whose members – generally young men – are aiming 
at “martyrdom” (death) by killing in the name of their faith. The victims of Daesh in France are 
thus perhaps the first victims of religious fanaticism since the wars of religion between Catholics 
and Protestants in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe. Historians specializing in this period have 
not been slow to point out the analogies between then and today9. In a short book written just 
after the January 2015 attacks, Denis Crouzet and Jean-Marie Le Gall reiterate that “the 
eschatological imaginary dimension is inherent to the religions of the Book” (CROUZET and LE 
GALL, 2015, p. 30) and point out the striking analogies between the apocalyptic spoken exchanges 
between Protestants and Catholics in 16th century Europe and Daesh’s current rhetoric and also 
the extreme violence which accompanied such discourse in both eras (Ibid., pp. 1-49). 
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In a short book published around ten years earlier entitled Les religions meurtrières 
(Murderous Religions), the historian of religious wars Eli Barnavi had put forward a similar point 
of view summed up in around ten “theses” (BARNAVI, 2006)10. In this book, he defined a 
particular form of religious fundamentalism specific to the monotheistic religions which he called 
“revolutionary fundamentalism”. These religions of revelation (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) 
indeed fulfil the three conditions necessary for the development of this kind of movement – the 
existence “of a corpus of sacred texts which express the divine word and on which people can base 
themselves”; the belief in one God with a universal vocation which creates a separation between 
the faithful and infidels and can lead the former to want to impose the “truth” on the latter; finally, 
the historical character of these religions based on a linear conception of time with a beginning 
and an end, the Last Judgement. For certain believers, the extreme anxiety it causes leads them to 
want to make the conclusion happen sooner and contemporary jihadism is based on this after 
many other historical examples in all three religions. However, Barnavi considers that historical 
circumstances enabled the jihadist potential within Islam to develop and primarily – as early as 
the 17thcentury and the defeat of the Turks at Vienna – the realization that the despised Western 
world had gained the upper hand over Islam and the inability in the 20th century of modernizing 
nationalism to catch up (from Atatürk to Erdogan through Bourguiba and Nasser). 
This idea is also present in Gilles Kepel’s book, Jihad, expansion et déclin de l’islamisme (Jihad, 
the Expansion and Decline of Islamism), published in 2000. He situated the emergence of what was 
still called “Islamism” in the 1970s – with the turning point of the Khomeinist Revolution in 1979 and 
the expansion of Saudi Arabian Wahhabism – and noted the first signs of it weakening at the dawn of 
the millennium. Despite the book’s title, at the time the subject was not the murderous jihad so 
spectacularly revealed by the September 11th attacks (which Kepel naturally could not predict) but 
instead the aspiration to replace the secular form of nationalism which had achieved decolonization 
in most of the Muslim countries with a new fundamentalist ideology (KEPEL, 2000)11. 
The contrary view to this historicization of jihadism is put forward by certain authors such as 
Ephraïm Herrera who consider jihad – which is by essence military action coupled with a religious 
obligation – is not a derivation of Islam but instead “a notion which has guided Muslims since the 
beginning of Islam and still continues to guide them in the present. Its surprising mass renewal now is 
in no way a deviation from the orthodox line or the history of Islam. It is rather their natural 
continuation after a short period of hibernation which was a consequence of the colonization of Islamic 
countries by Western powers. Jihad involved and still involves acts which we consider profoundly cruel 
– murders, massacres, enslavement of women and children, rapes and pillaging, all in the name of 
religion” (HERRERA, 2015, p. 357). In other words, Islam is a conquering religion of which jihadism is 
the military expression and which continued in different parts of the world until the abolition of the 
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ottoman Caliphate by Atatürk in 1924 (Ibid., p. 117). It could be said that this vision of Islam is 
consistent with the view of jihadists themselves who consider they defend the only authentic Islam. 
This type of thesis naturally primarily preoccupies Muslim religious leaders who try to 
distance themselves from fanatics by claiming that attacks have “nothing to do” with the religion. 
This debate generally ends in a dead end involving the existence of a “good Islam” (moderate and 
peaceful) and a “bad Islam” (intolerant and violent), a distinction which Herrera vigorously 
refutes (Ibid., p. 129)12. A variant of this debate involves the question of whether all tendencies of 
fundamentalism are equal. Thus the question is whether quietist fundamentalism inspired by 
Sufism (and judged as heretical by Daesh) or even non-violent Salafism act as firewalls against or 
conversely footboards leading towards jihadism (KHOSROKHAVAR, 2014, pp. 131-132)13. 
 
Secularization as an epistemological obstacle 
 
Whereas it can hardly be disputed that jihadism is a variety of Islam, although deviant, debate 
is raging as to whether the religion plays a driving role in the passage into terrorism. 
In my view, this controversy is largely due to a specific national characteristic: in a 
society which is as deeply secular as in France, the fact that religious motivation can be at 
the heart of current events is actually beyond understanding unlike previous waves of 
terrorism which were inspired by motives which were secular and political or geopolitical in 
nature even if their legitimacy could be debated. Jean Birnbaum summed this situation up 
well when he wrote that “for secular thinkers, anyone who is mad about God is simply mad” 
(BIRNBAUM, 20/07/2016). 
Here we are dealing with a true “epistemological obstacle” 14 and, as I shall explain further 
on, there are quite a number of researchers who find it hard to admit that faith could be the 
main motivation for jihadism15. This situation has been highlighted by Crouzet and Le Gall 
who points out “religious exculturation” as preventing us from “understanding the strength 
of religion in a society” (CROUZET and LE GALL, 2015, p. 18)16. 
In his essay “Un silence religieux: La gauche face au jihadisme” (A Religious Silence: The Left 
Faced with Jihadism, 2016), Jean Birnbaum puts the blame on a generalized form of deliberate 
blindness: “Henceforth, not only are we convinced that religion belongs to the past but the very 
idea that it could have its own political force seems extravagant. When men invoke God to spread 
terror in the heart of Paris, we are quick to describe their actions as absurdity or madness which 
should no longer exist” (BIRNBAUM, 2016, p. 34). However, Birnbaum makes the political and 
intellectual left politically and intellectually responsible for this attitude: “wherever there is 
religion, the left sees no trace of politics. As soon as politics is involved the left claims this has 
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‘nothing to do’ with religion” (Ibid., p. 40) as the main heads of state have claimed after each 
attack. He also stresses the extent to which this idea “that it has nothing to do with it” – which is 
initially an attempt by political leaders to avoid any generalized stigmatization of Muslims in 
France as well as possible revenge attacks – tends to obscure Islam's internal conflicts and greatly 
weakens the position of those Muslim intellectuals who indeed fight fundamentalism like 
Abdelwahab Meddeb (Professor at Paris-Ouest Nanterre University and specialist on Islam who 
passed away in 2014) who, in his book La maladie de l’islam (The Illness of Islam, Seuil, 2002) 
wrote: “Fanaticism was the illness of Catholicism, Nazism was Germany's illness and similarly 
then it is sure that fundamentalism is Islam’s illness”17. 
 
 
‘The Islamization of radicalism’ or the ‘radicalization of Islam?’ – a false debate? 
 
Leaving to one side the minority of specialists who see jihad as a natural manifestation of 
Islam, at least three approaches to this question can be discerned: (a) those who think adhering to 
jihadism derives from young people’s radical aspirations – a position which can be subsumed with 
the expression “the Islamization of radicalism”; (b) those who think jihadism is the result of a 
deliberate strategy of movements which advocate violence and thus the phrase “the radicalization 
of Islam” is used; (c) finally there are those who reject the two previous standpoints. Before 
examining each of them, it should be noted that these debates refer to French or Western jihadists 
who are only a minority among all those who have joined the theatre of war in the Middle East. 
 
The Islamization of radicalism 
 
This position is based on the paradoxical observation that, although jihadist movements 
claim to have a fundamentalist conception of Islam based on what they consider to be a literal 
reading of the Quran, on the other hand it is a well-established fact today that, despite frequently 
having Maghrebi background, the actual religious knowledge of aspiring jihadists and their 
knowledge of Arabic are extremely rudimentary. Many have never regularly practiced the religion 
and do not respect ritual rules about food, alcohol or sexuality at all. Therefore a legitimate 
question can be asked about the place of Islam in the trajectory of jihadists and this has led to 
many researchers using this observation to reduce the role played by Islam in people becoming 
jihadists or even to deny the religion has any influence at all. This is the case of three books from 
2016 by Alain Bertho, Raphaël Liogier and, in a more nuanced style, by Olivier Roy. The first is a 
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sociologist specializing in urban protests and riots, the second is a specialist of the sociology of 
religions and the third is an Islamologist who specializes in Central Asia rather than the Levant. 
In his book Les enfants du chaos: Essai sur les temps des martyrs (The Children of Chaos: 
An Essay on the Times of Martyrs, 2016) Alain Bertho18 adopts a macro-sociological and 
international standpoint in which jihadism is just one aspect of the crisis caused by globalization 
and characterized by three main features – the rise of riots throughout the world; a crisis of states’ 
legitimacy deriving from their “permanent use of lies” (BERTHO, 2016, p. 62); and the correlative 
search for such States of new legitimacy in law and order policies stoked up by the veritable rise 
of terrorist attacks throughout the world (Ibid., p. 69). 
From this perspective, jihadism is only an outlet: “This is not a radicalization of Islam but instead 
the Islamization of the anger, distress and despair of the lost children of a terrible era who find meaning 
and weapons for their rage in jihad” (Ibid., p. 13). Jihadism “is a long-lasting and strong strategy 
against globalization and the powers which direct it. Through terror, it affirms an identity with a 
universal vocation serving a religious power, the Caliphate, with no less ambition (than globalization)” 
(Ibid., p. 99). In this way, it proposes a trans-national alternative “to the deadly unification of the 
markets” by proposing “a collective and individual meaning, strategy and ethics” (Ibid., p. 101) for the 
“lost children of the chaos caused by devastating globalization” (Ibid., p. 17). This is also one of the 
consequences of the debacle of revolutionary communist ideology. This has left a void which the jihad 
proposes to fill with “a truly political solution involving the conversion of the self, the end of history 
and martyrdom as liberation” (Ibid., p. 206). To combat this, Bertho calls for a new form of 
“contemporary radicalism” capable of giving new meaning to the dispersed and disparate revolts 
which are multiplying. 
Clearly from this standpoint, the actual Muslim religious dimension of the phenomenon of 
adhering to jihadism is completely secondary. It is only one solution among others to a certain 
form of despair or certain aspirations of young people (because it is accepted that the large 
majority of affiliates from other countries than those directly concerned are young). The prime 
factor is the radicalism of a faction of young people which is borne of the situation into which 
they have been put. In Marxist terms, this would be called alienation. 
Similarly, Raphaël Liogier’s19 book La guerre des civilisations n’aura pas lieu: Coexistence et 
violence au XXIe siècle  (The War of Civilizations Will Not Take Place: Coexistence and Violence in 
the 21st Century, 2016), has a much broader subject than jihadism alone to which he only devotes 
around ten pages. However in the book, he mentions “jihadism without Islam” (LIOGIER, 2016, p. 
195) whose adepts are initially attracted by a taste for adventure or for warrior exploits (“a radical 
version of tourism of the extreme” (Idem). For him, European jihadists “convert directly to jihadism 
without first passing through Islam” (Idem) and religious fundamentalism only appears 
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subsequently “because this is part of a legionary’s panoply” (Ibid., p. 197). In his view, “the new 
jihadists are recruited rather than indoctrinated" (Ibid., 198). However, unlike Roy – and in a rather 
counter-intuitive manner if one considers the final destiny of murderous jihadists – he sees no 
nihilism because he considers that “terrorists are not motivated by the desire to die but to live more 
intensely, like radical vegans, pietistic Salafists or neo-Buddhists”. In this, they are part of a much 
broader movement involving the renewal of fundamentalism of all religions but which is 
characterized by the individualism of modernity: “This is a hypermodern infiltration of Islam rather 
than an Islamic infiltration of modernity” (LIOGIER, 04/10/2016). 
The anthropologist Scott Atran (15/12/2015) shares Liogier's point of view when he writes: 
 
what inspires the most lethal assailants in the world today is not so much the Quran or religious teachings 
but rather a thrilling cause and a call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends. 
Foreign volunteers for the Islamic State are often youth in transitional stages in their lives – immigrants, 
students, people between jobs and before finding their mates. Having left their homes, they seek new 
families of friends and fellow travellers to find purpose and significance. 
 
The sociologist Smaain Laacher is more categorical when he affirms that "we are not dealing 
with “radicalization” but with “political violence” (LAACHER, 31/07/2016)20. 
However an article by Olivier Roy published in Le Monde in November 2015 (ROY, 
23/11/2015) called “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste” (Jihadism is a 
generational and nihilistic revolt) and then developed in his book Le Jihad et la mort (Jihad and 
Death, 2016)21 brought this point of view to the attention of the general public, particularly as it 
led to controversy with Gilles Kepel. For Roy (2016), jihadism is a kind of adolescent revolt which 
affects two precise categories in France – either those of the “second generation” who were born 
in France or arrived when very young in France or converts who are in a generational revolt 
against their parents “or more exactly with what their parents represent in terms of culture and 
religion”. In the first case, they reject their parents’ culture (whether Muslim or not) and the 
“Western” culture they grew up in without actually having any attachments to the traditional 
practice of the Muslim religion. They are like “born again” believers who are proud to take back 
“for themselves an identity which they see their parents as having debased: they are ‘more Muslim 
than Muslims’ and particularly than their parents. (…) As for converts, they choose Islam because 
it is the only solution on the market for radical revolt. Joining Daesh is a certain way of terrorizing 
people”. He therefore rejects the idea of a “radicalization of Islam” and affirms the idea of an 
“Islamization of radicalism”.  
In his recent essay which aims to develop this point of view, he adopts a more qualified 
standpoint. He places more emphasis on the religious nature of this form of revolt: “(...) obviously 
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the choice made by radicals to identify with jihad and claim to be part of a radical Islamist 
organization is not a mere opportunistic choice. The reference to Islam is central to their decision 
to act and makes the whole difference with other forms of violence among young people” (p. 61). 
Later he writes that “it is nevertheless clear that these young radicals are sincere believers. They 
think they will go to heaven and their references are profoundly Islamic” (p. 73) even if this is a 
sui generic Islam particularly because of its apocalyptic and nihilistic character. 
What Roy calls “nihilism” – and defines with a phrase like “the inanity of life” (p. 93) – is at 
the heart of his point of view as the title of his book indicates: 
 
Living in an Islamic society does not interest jihadists on the contrary to those who just come to fulfil the 
hijra [living in a Muslim land] because the radicals come to die rather than to live. This is the paradox – 
these young radicals are not utopians they are nihilists because they are millenarians. (…) This is the no 
future generation (p. 93).  
 
He believes jihadists see themselves as an avant-garde which attain the level of the Prophet through 
death in an "apocalypse [which] will in any case annihilate all which was created by Man" (98)22. 
 
The radicalization of Islam 
 
Gilles Kepel (2015) opposed these theses in his extremely well-argued and researched book 
about the Paris terrorist attacks and their origins called “Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the 
West”23. For him, contemporary terrorism is situated at the crossroads between the evolution of 
Muslim fundamentalism (on the international scale) and the specific characteristics of the 
situation in France. Jihadism's murderous violence is an integral part of the history of a certain 
form of Muslim fundamentalism, “jihadist Salafism” which was theorized and spread throughout 
Europe in 2005 by the Syrian Abu Musab al-Suri who committed the Madrid terrorist attacks 
(March 2004)24. He identified a first victorious Islamist wave in Afghanistan in the 1980s followed 
by a second wave incarnated by al-Qaeda in the 2000s. Both these waves failed to involve the 
Muslim masses and he attempts to go beyond this strategic failure by creating the theory of a “3rd 
wave” consisting of “a local form of jihadism with a reticular system which infiltrates the base and 
no longer the summits of the enemy societies which must be destroyed” and is intended to lead 
to “civil war in Europe led by badly-integrated and rebellious young immigrant Muslims when 
they have been suitably indoctrinated and given military training for a local battlefield” (KEPEL, 
2015, p. 52). Kepel believes that the development of social networks spread these ideas over the 
next decade while the later decomposition of the Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan states created favourable 
conditions for these ideas to be implemented through the proximity of the battlefield with Europe. 
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For Kepel, the genesis of French jihadism can be found in the convergence in the 1990s of the 
“repercussions of the Algerian civil war, the vector of armed Salafism” and “the first effects of Saudi 
preaching (…) which advocated a radical break with the values of infidel French society but without 
violence”. This situation led to a first phase of terrorist attacks which ended with the police killing 
the main protagonists in 1995-6, although the underground development of radicalization networks 
went on (Idem, ibidem, p. 119). These networks found a favourable breeding ground in “the third 
generation of Islam in France” (Idem, ibidem, p. 29), the children of post-colonial immigration, 
which emerged politically around 2005 and which “for the first time in the short history of French 
Islam involved a large majority (…) of educated French citizens born in the country and who are 
native French speakers” (Idem, ibidem, p. 48) but many of whom felt they were not recognized as 
such by French society25. Salafist movements then jihadist groups managed to recruit people among 
the disappointed and those who were left behind in this generation by offering them “an imaginary 
solution to change society’s dead ends which was even more attractive because it managed to 
combine in part pre-existing far left and far right radical utopian ideas or to replace them as is shown 
by the unbelievable increase in conversions” (Idem, ibidem, p. 30). 
As can be seen, the disagreement between Kepel and his detractors involves less the 
expectations of aspiring jihadists – about which nearly everyone is in agreement – than the 
underlying mutations of Islam which he accuses such detractors of not understanding and not 
wanting to study for fear of being accused of Islamophobia (KEPEL and ROUGIER, 14/03/2016). 
Particularly and unlike Liogier, he sees a form of continuity – nevertheless without determinism – 
between the supposedly non-violent variety of Salafism and jihadism. This position has also been 
supported by intellectuals from Muslim countries like the writer Kamel Daoud or Abdelwahab 
Meddeb. In short, the idea which most blatantly opposes Kepel and his detractors is that he believes 




François Burgat, the “third party” in this controversy, has had less media attention than the 
two discussed above. He is however a recognized specialist of Islamic studies and particularly of 
political Islam. He wrote several press articles during the controversy and published a very 
interesting book in which he recalls his career path and thinking while explaining at length the 
objections he has to the ideas of Roy and Kepel who he ends up viewing as interchangeable27. 
In this book, he sets out his point of view in the very first lines: “the tensions which affect 
relations between the Western and Muslim worlds have much more political than ideological 
origins” (BURGAT, 2016, p. 5). According to Burgat (Ibid., p. 7), the rise of Islamism since the 
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emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 reflects a “process of reconquest” after the “culture 
of the losers” in colonization faced with the “symbolic universe of the colonizer” and more broadly 
the West (for countries which avoided direct colonization). He stresses that the force of the 
attraction of this “rediscovered Muslim vocabulary” is more to do with its “endogenous character” 
than its “sacred dimension” (Ibid., p. 8). In his own terms, Burgat’s views do not differ from those 
of Barnavi or Kepel regarding the reactive character of Islamism but he sees a phenomenon in this 
which is more cultural (“identity-based”) than religious and stresses that the generalized adoption 
of the “Islamic vocabulary” does not lead to uniformity in political practices which can actually 
remain extremely diverse (Ibid., pp. 11-12). In other words, use of the “Islamic vocabulary” is 
profoundly identity-based in character and its objective is to “put an end to symbolic European 
supremacy" but the causes of this movement are non-religious and “do not derive in any way from 
particular inherent features of the Muslim culture or religion” (Ibid., p. 12). 
Through a “process of cultural reappropriation”, a sectarian form of radicalization can 
develop on this Islamist base which is “the most often reactive in nature" and whose "most 
profound motive is prior violence”28. Burgat therefore rejects Kepel’s thesis that sectarian 
radicalization “is allegedly the precursor or the cause of political radicalization” (Ibid., p. 13) and 
suggests that on the contrary it is the product thereof (which brings him closer to Roy’s ideas). 
Moving on from this point, the understanding of this phenomenon requires “the responsibility 
which is essential and nevertheless too often neglected of non-Muslims in the creation of jihadist 
violence” (Ibid., p. 256) to be taken into account. 
Without going into details about his disagreements with his two colleagues – who he 
ironically thanks for “having given him the irrepressible desire to express other convictions” 
(Ibid., p. 23) – his criticisms can be summarized as follows29. He criticizes Kepel for “a formalist 
drift in ideas” which under the cover “of the meticulous listing of its diverse formal characteristics 
leads to the active and oppositional dimension of the Islamist phenomenon being hidden” (Ibid., 
p. 266). He considers that Kepel gives disproportionate importance to “hypothetical intellectual 
genealogies with founding landmark doctrinal or programmatic texts which are linked by human 
or technological vectors” (Ibid., p. 267) and neglects the impact of the North/South domination 
on the phenomenon. In other terms, he considers that Kepel concentrates on “how” jihadism 
comes to pass while neglects “why” this is the case and his merely book-based approach leads him 
to exaggerate the influence of the theoreticians of Islamism and to look for the cause of the 
phenomenon therein and particularly in the Salafist version of Islamism. And yet, for Burgat, 
definitively stating that Islam is the cause of jihadism represents a form of culturalism (Ibid., p. 
12, 279) which is a real anathema in the French social sciences and can be surprising from a person 
who himself insists on the “identity-based” character of Islamism. 
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He is equally critical of Roy for partly different reasons. He disagrees with Roy’s view “that the 
rise of European jihadism is just due to a sort of psychosocial tension of individuals in a state of relative 
historical and social lack of belonging to their environment” (Ibid., p. 281) and also objects to Roy 
replacing a political explanation with a “paradigm of the racaille (lower class scum)” which portrays 
“individuals who are socially deprived and intellectually and politically spineless and whose most 
important characteristic is that they are radically cut off from the thinking of Muslims from France or 
elsewhere and only motivated by an individual pathology qualified without further details as nihilism” 
(Ibid., p. 281). Burgat refutes this view which he views as psychologically shallow and considers that it 
cannot explain the Daesh phenomenon as a whole by taking into account its European, Syrian and 
Iraqi dimensions. For Burgat, Roy therefore tends to extrapolate and make one of the phenomenon’s 
facets a principle for an overall explanation while ignoring (like Kepel) “the relations of domination to 
which the Muslim part of the population are submitted thus masking what I personally consider to be 
the profound roots of the problem” (Ibid., p. 284). Similarly, he estimates that the case of converts – 
“last minute passengers” of jihadism “who got on a train which had already departed” (Ibid., p. 287) – 
has a specific explanation which possesses no decisive explanatory capacity. 
To sum up, then, for Burgat, the two theses of Kepel and Roy are linked insofar as they “exonerate 
our policies from almost all responsibility” (Ibid., p. 290) both concerning the living conditions of 
Muslims in France and French foreign policy and military intervention in the Middle East. 
 
 
Jihadism: an excess of ideas and a deficit of data? 
 
The debates which I have just discussed oppose, as we have seen, a relatively limited number 
of protagonists and the controversies involved – exacerbated by the media – also involve long-
standing personal rivalries and even territorial arguments which tend to harden the respective 
positions of those involved. However these divergences also derive from disciplinary orientations 
and different research experiences. To mention only the recognized specialists of Islam: Kepel is 
a political scientist who initially specialized in Egypt and Middle Eastern countries and who has 
also studied the situation of Islam in France a great deal. He speaks Arabic; Roy is an 
anthropologist, a specialist on Central Asia (Iran and Afghanistan in particular) but studies the 
question of religions in general. He speaks Persian but not Arabic; Burgat is a political scientist 
who speaks Arabic and is a specialist on Islamism, the Maghreb, the Middle East and the Gulf.30 
Given these conditions, which significant points should be retained from these controversies? 
Several objections can be made about the denial of the religious dimension by the most 
radical believers in the theory of the “Islamization of radicalism” like Bertho and Liogier. In 
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reality, this approach to jihadism consists in opposing jihadists as they really are with how one  
imagines they ought to be as practising Muslims. Roy does not fall into this trap, particularly in 
his book. One might ask whether it is necessary to be a theologian to join a religious movement 
and whether the rudimentary faith of  a born again believer is not  a more effective factor in total 
adhesion to that movement? Moreover, can we believe that all those who went on crusades or 
took part in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacres were on both sides actually practising 
Christians? Is there not a lack of seriousness or a form of arrogance in not wanting to take 
seriously the religious convictions affirmed by those who are ready to sacrifice their lives for 
them31? This standpoint tends to underestimate the diversity of religious practices and forms of 
religiosity and also of the fact that by creating a “radical separation between the pure and the 
impure”, religion is an ideological factor which unifies jihadists in the same cause despite their 
social origins and backgrounds separating them32. It also transgresses the principle set out – in 
my view correctly – by the sociologist Cyril Lemieux (EHESS) which stipulates that it is not up to 
sociologists “to categorically state what is the true Islam and claim on this basis that young 
radicalized people should or should not be considered as true Muslims”33. 
A similar objection can be made to Burgat’s views. The theory by which Islamism constitutes 
in some way an attempt to return to the “identity-based” sources of the Muslim world whose 
motives and objectives are however above all political makes it difficult to account for the suicidal 
and deadly nature of the jihadists’ range of acts. Moreover he does not discuss this point in depth. 
For him, the religious reference has an essentially formal character – it is “speech” which can lead 
to very different “actions” – and faith is not taken into account. 
Does this mean that we need to make a choice between the proponents of these different theories? 
All the authors we have discussed claim to have the key solution to the phenomenon under study. 
Some position themselves on the side of the expectations expressed by young people (Bertho, Liogier, 
Roy) while others focus on the ideology on offer and its underlying networks (Kepel, Burgat) and there 
are also sometimes important differences of opinion on both sides. For some, political radicalization 
comes before religious radicalization (Roy, Burgat, Bertho, Liogier, Atran) while others (Kepel, 
Rougier) believe the contrary. And yet it is difficult to see why these different configurations could not 
exist simultaneously among the population concerned and correspond to different, distinct routes 
towards radicalization – and perhaps to different roles within the movement – which would need to 
be studied for their own worth and whose respective importance would also need to be grasped. The 
real challenge is to understand how the specific offer of violence attracts a public and succeeds in 
getting people involved which thus leads on to the issue of radicalization34. 
The right method therefore seems to attempt to resituate jihadism in the broader perspective 
of adhesion to “extreme thought” (to use a term formulated by Bronner (2016) or more generally 
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to political violence precisely in order to isolate its specific features35. The intellectual tools to 
study the phenomena of radicalization exist and research has been carried out into a wide range 
of radical movements throughout the world since McAdam’s (1986) seminal work on high-risk 
activism36. However, although the French scientific community began working a great deal on the 
subject after the French terrorist attacks and the mass departure of aspiring jihadists to Middle 
East37, this empirical research is only beginning to bear its fruits. These studies have very varying 
scales and ranges and it is not possible to provide a detailed analysis thereof herein. Some of this 
research has been mentioned in the article however and we shall simply cite others.  
Apart from the aforementioned research by Khosrokhavar (2014) and Atran (2010, 2015), we may 
also cite Benslama and Khosrokhavar's research (2017) based on around sixty cases of female jihadists 
who left France. They describe the diversity of these women's relations with political and religious 
commitments. Truong’s book (2017), based on a long-term ethnographical study in two districts of the 
Paris region, gives a well-nuanced portrait of the drift towards jihadism notably referring to Amédy 
Coulibaly who committed the attack on the Hypercacher supermarket in January 2015. 
A certain number of recent studies take court cases as their starting point. This is the case of 
the work by Crettiez, Seze, Ainine and Lindemann (2017) who interviewed around twenty of those 
convicted (a third for regionalist or nationalist terrorism and the other two thirds for jihadist 
terrorism) and analyzed radicalization as a complex process of evolution involving structural 
determining factors, multiple socialization processes and the psychological dimension of 
commitment. Other research was based on court case sources like the study by Hecker (2018) 
who was inspired by Sageman’s work (2005) and analyzed 137 judgements involving jihadists to 
provide an interesting quantitative analysis. This was also the case of the research carried out by 
Bonelli and Carrié (2018) into 133 cases of male and female minors prosecuted for terrorism or 
“radicalization”. This study stresses the importance of the feeling of being relegated to an inferior 
status at school in the gradual adhesion to radical forms of Islam. 
The research carried out by Galland and Muxel (2018) is even more ambitious and focuses 
on political radicalism among young people. It is based on a set of quantitative and qualitative 
surveys involving 7000 secondary school pupils and argues that this radicalism involves a 
significant minority of teenagers and that the specifically religious and identity-based dimension 
of phenomenon seems to be more decisive than socio-economic factors. 
Clearly then we are only at the start of a vast effort to increase knowledge, the results of which 
are sometimes contrasting. A summary report of such findings will of course be needed at the 
suitable moment38. However these first results tend to put the simplistic theoretical oppositions 
discussed above into perspective and show that the question is more complex than first thought. 
 
 





1 This work was carried out in the framework of the Capes-Cofecub (n° Sh 815-37, 2015-2018) project “Passages de 
frontières et villes sûres: Enjeux historiques et contemporains” (Border Crossings and Safe Towns: Important Historical and 
Contemporary Issues). This text revisits and goes into more depth on ideas presented at several conferences at the 
Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar, Brazil) (September 8th 2016), at the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF, 
Brazil) (IV Seminário Internacional INCT-InEAC, September 13th 2016); see (on-line): http://www.ineac.uff.br/?q=news/iv-
semin%C3%A1rio-internacional-do-inctineac-0) and during a conference at the UnB Futuro (Universidade de Brasilia, 
September 27th 2016; see (RABELO, 27/09/2016) and at my speech which opened the Vth Seminário internacional “Violência 
e conflitos sociais: Criminalização, controle e punição”, Laboratório de Estudos da Violência (LEV), Universidade Federal do 
Ceará, Fortaleza, November 29th-December 2nd 2016. Translated by Richard Dickinson (Inist-CNRS). 
2 Between 2012 and 2018, we can estimate that there have been around twenty attacks, over ten attempted attacks and 
at least around fifty foiled attacks. It is not easy to count the attacks and the number varies according to the sources 
consulted because of variations in how attacks are counted particularly when the same culprit carries out a series of attacks 
over a short period (cf. Mehra). The counts also vary when there are simultaneous or coordinated attacks (Paris, 2015) and 
it is sometimes unclear whether the targets or the operations were counted. Also the distinction between an actual attack 
and an attempt or between an attempt and a plan is not always clear and the same source can provide different counts 
at different moments with no justification given. 
3 See Audureau, Zerrouky and Vaudano (28/07/2016), which is a very complete comparative file on Daesh attacks all over 
the world (the Excel database is available at this address). 
4 The place of women in Daesh jihadism strongly distinguishes this movement from its competitors such as Al-Qaeda. 
Women are said to have represented a third of French jihadists in 2015 (at the highpoint of the wave of departures) which 
is more than in Germany (20 %), less than in the Netherlands (40%) but well above the European average (10%). Among 
these women there are more converts and minors than among the men (a third) and they are said to come from poorer 
backgrounds than the men (BENSLAMA and KHOSROKHAVAR, 2017, pp. 13-15). 
5 These estimations are based on different sources – government statements, specialist organizations – International 
Center for Counter-terrorism (The Hague), Combating Terrorism Center (West Point (USA), The Soufan Group, Centre d’analyse 
du terrorisme (CAT, Paris) – and the press. For estimations, see Hosxe (10/11/2017); for deaths in Syria/Iraq see 20 Minutes 
(01/09/2017); also see Mouren et al. (21/03/2016) . As this survey carried out by students at SciencePo Paris indicates, the 
French authorities can only make an estimation of deaths based on indirect information. The survey could only document 
68 cases from the 168 estimated deaths at the time (only men) with 53 having sworn allegiance to Daesh. As a comparison 
the number of combatants from the EU is said to be between 4000 and 5000 with three quarters coming from 4 countries 
- Belgium, France, Germany, UK (France is first in terms of the absolute figure with Belgium first in proportion per 
inhabitant). However Europeans are a minority among all the foreign fighters who are estimated at 30,000. It should also 
be reiterated that volunteers leaving to fight in other countries is a fairly common historical phenomenon (BONELLI, 2015; 
BIRNBAUM, 2016, p. 177 s.). 
6 The citation comes from the Larousse dictionary, see (on-line): www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/terrorisme/77478; 
the expression "method of action" refers to the distinction made by Michel Wieviorka between a method and a logic of 
action. The first refers to the instrumental character of terrorism in the political struggle while the second refers to the 
"mythical or artificial" relation the terrorist group has "with the cause it supports, with the social, national or religious 
movement of which it claims to be the highest expression, with the tangible population which claims to represent and 
which, if it exists, it ignores or rejects" (WIEVIORKA, 1993, p. 610). On the semantic evolution of the notion, see Tolomelli 
(2016). 
7 See for example Laqueur (2016), Raflik (2016); on the definition of terrorism, see Rapin (2014). 
8 According to Burgat (2016, p. 16) these attacks are an example of manipulation by the Algerian powers-that-be. 
9 As the historian Olivier Christin pointed out in an article for the French newspaper Libération (July 18th 2016), for the 
Fathers of the Church "it is not suffering but the cause which makes the martyr (Augustin, sermon 328)". Similarly according 
to him the terrorist acts must be able "to be attributed to an ideology and organized movement which must accept that 
this is the case" and is not defined by "the number of deaths, the abject nature of the means used or ardent but recent 
religious convictions" (see CHRISTIN, 18/07/2016). 
10 Elie Barnavi is also a specialist of the history of the Jews and Israel. He was the Israeli ambassador in France for a while. 
11 As Leïla Dakhli (2016), points out in an article which is extremely useful to understand the university environment 
concerned, after September 11th 2001 Kepel was sharply attacked for having dared announce a decline in Islamism. The 
same was true for Roy who argued similarly in 1992 and persisted with the point of view when his book was republished 
more recently (ROY, 1992, 2015). See Burgat (2016, p. 254 s.) on this subject. 
                                                 
 




12 This defensive position adopted by the Muslim authorities in Western countries is frequently transmitted by the civil 
authorities aiming to avoid amalgams likely to lead to acts of vengeance being committed against Muslim citizens. There 
is a conspirationist variant of this position which claims that, as Islam cannot by essence lead to such acts of cruelty, they 
must be the result of a plot to implicate Islam to harm the religion. In this kind of conspiracy theory which began to 
develop after the September 11th attacks in New York, generally the Jewish and/or Americans and/or the West are blamed. 
I shall not discuss this second point further as it is the subject of another discussion (see TAGUIEFF, 2002) 
13 The Iranian writer Chahla Chafiq criticized the distinction between these two variants of fundamentalism in an article 
entitled "Soutenir l’islamisme c’est entrer dans le djihadisme" (Supporting Islamism means entering jihadism, Le Monde, 
August 9th 2016, p. 23). A similar view was expressed by Farid Abdelkrim who considered the Muslim Brotherhood, of 
which he had been an active member, to be the source of recruits to jihadism (Le Monde, September 4th. 2016). Roy puts 
forward the idea of a common matrix between Salafism and Daesh instead but insists more on the distance between the 
two both in Daesh's "theology" and in the behaviour of jihadists (ROY, 2016b, pp. 99-110). 
14 On this notion, see Bachelard (1938) and Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (2006[1968]). 
15 The implications of secularization which concerns all the established religions have been analyzed well by the 
Islamologist (and specialist of Central Asia) Olivier Roy in his book which is significantly entitled "La sainte ignorance, le 
temps de la religion sans culture" (Sacred ignorance – the times of religion without culture; ROY, 2008). 
16 This point of view is the basis of Barnavi's book (2006). 
17 Cited by Birnbaum (2016, p. 53). 
18 Professor at Paris 8 University and sociologist 
19 Professor at Sciences Po (Aix-en-Provence), sociologist of religions and philosopher. 
20 The author of the article is a sociology professor at the University of Strasbourg. 
21 Roy (2016, p. 15) indicates that he borrowed the phrase "the Islamization of radicalism" from Bertho. 
22 In an article published before the emergence of Daesh, Roy (2014) had already put forward the idea of a nihilism based 
on the feeling of not belonging to a tangible Muslim community and made a comparison with Columbine-like mass 
murders in the United States and elsewhere (for a criticism of this point of view, see Hassid [2014]). 
23 As he speaks Arabic, this gives him direct access to the original texts unlike most of the other researchers mentioned 
herein (apart from Burgat). This means he can decipher the Salafist re-reading of the past – like for example the choice of 
symbolic dates for the terrorist attacks – and the multiple religious references in the original versions of propaganda texts. 
24 This connection is disputed by Roy (2016, p. 134) and Burgat (2016, p. 267, 278 s.) who believe that Al Suri had no 
influence on Daesh or on the jihadist base. 
25 This is an important disagreement with Roy (2016, p.44) who refutes Kepel's thesis of a 3rd generation. But this is partly 
based on a misunderstanding because Kepel does not use the term "generation" in a biographical sense (i.e. the 
grandchildren of immigrants) but rather historically (the first generation educated in France, Kepel [2016, p. 48 s.]). There 
is still a disagreement about the phenomenon's chronology. Roy considers that there is not a fundamental break between 
Al Qaeda or Daesh jihadism and thus goes back to the beginning of this wave in the middle of the 1990s unlike Kepel for 
whom the movement begins in the middle of the 2000s. 
26 However, his thinking does not seem so far from Roy's views when he writes: "The objective of jihadist terrorism is make 
[French society] implode by mobilizing behind its activists and "martyrs" the radicalized children of retrocolonial 
immigration from the Muslim world. But also by bringing together all the discontented people who hate a system which 
excludes them particularly among young people who feel lost and with no future for whom the conversion to jihadist Islamism 
involves or replaces both far left and far right militancy". Similar could be said of his view that: “those who claim to be part 
of ‘integral’ Islam in its varied forms and move from identity-based overexcitement to actual violence transform their social 
fury into a political strategy through their recourse to religion” (KEPEL, 2015, resp. p. 250 et 316; italics added by the author). 
27 See for example Burgat (07/07/2016), Ayad, Hennion and Zerrouky (21/10/2016); and above all Burgat (2016). Also see 
(on-line) the debate between Burgat and Roy: http://savoirs.ens.fr/expose.php?id=2602 . Bonnefoy (2017) has proposed 
an analysis which is quite close to Burgat's. 
28 In a recently re-published book Liogier (2012, 2016) also defended the point of view that "the negative perception of 
Islam was in itself one of the causes for it becoming a standard bearer for deprived young people who are crushed by 
frustration and the desire for vengeance" (p. 206). 
29 Burgat provides a subtle analysis of his ideas which are related to those of Roy and Kepel in chapter 13 of his book and 
situates the origin of their disagreements in their respective experiences of research. While he recognizes that both 
authors have certain qualities, this analysis still includes gibes like when he criticizes Roy for his lack of linguistic and 
sociological knowledge of the Arab world and suggests Kepel has a limited and 'socialite' vision of the "field" in the 
countries visited. 
 




30 See Dakhli (2016) on this point who shows that the alliances between the main protagonists of these debates can fluctuate 
according to the moment and the themes involved. To shed light on these disagreements, the recent account given by Burgat 
(2016, 254 s.) is very useful. See also: Bonzon (06/03/2016), Guillebaud (04/04/2016), Daumas (14/04/2016). 
31 On the fundamental importance of death in jihadism, see the analysis by Khosrokhavar (2018, p. 551 s.). 
32 In this sense, see Birnbaum (2016, pp. 26-27). The quote is by Barnavi (2006, p. 27).  
33 Libération, January 31st – February 1st 2015, p. 27; also see Roy (2016b, p. 99). 
34 We know that Daesh used an extremely elaborate form of marketing and set up structures which enabled it to attract 
its "clientele" and lead them where the organization wanted them to go. 
35 Sageman (2017), Bonnefoy (2017). Kepel continuously argues in favour of the absolute specific nature of his subject and 
thus refuses to deal with the problem in this way because "it dilutes in generality a phenomenon, the specific nature of 
which is forbidden to be thought about – even in a comparative manner" by grouping together The Red Brigades, Daesh 
and other sectarianisms. Thus no serious survey is required "because we already know the answer". The weakness of this 
position – which partly seems to derive from a logic of competition between scholars – lies in the fact that it does not 
really provide an alternative and settles for arguing in favour of the development of new theories and instruments which 
are adapted to the specific features of jihadist ideologies, behaviour and practices. See his reply to Roy: Kepel and Rougier 
(14/03/2016); also see Kepel and Rougier (2016, p. 43). 
36 As for example, Xavier Crettiez (2006, 2011 a et b) shows by his review of a great deal of research into diverse historical 
situations. Also see Neumann's anthology (2015).  
37 See for example the French National Center for Scientific Research's initiatives which have developed 60 research projects 
(https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/nos-blogs/face-au-terrorisme-la-recherche-en-action/comprendre-la-radicalisation) or those of the 
Fondation de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme as part of its "Plateforme violence et sortie de la violence" (Violence and 
leaving violence platform) (see [on-line]: http://www.fmsh.fr/fr/recherche/24279) and its "Observatoire des radicalisations" 
(Observatory of radicalization). There has also been a multiplication of scientific events involving this subject. A recent survey 
found 37 meetings or conferences announcements in France on subjects linked to this question for 2018 (disseminated on 
the digital mailing list of the Association nationale des candidats aux métiers de la science politique (National Association of 
Candidates for Political Science Professions ANCMSP) by A. Jossin on January 22nd 2018). However the development of this 
research is still hampered by difficulties in accessing data which the authorities consider too sensitive.  
38 For a first comparative summary, see Khosrokhavar (2018) and particularly the concluding chapter of the work. 
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